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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

NO. 38404
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2009-29933

)

MICHAEL ROWE RUSSO,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case raises a critical question concerning the Fourth Amendment's
preference for search warrants, and its requirement that such warrants "particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched: Can a reviewing court expand the scope of a
search warrant (as described in that warrant's clear language), under the guise of giving
it a "commonsense" interpretation.
Michael Russo stands convicted of rape and two related felonies, and is currently
serving a fixed life sentence. On appeal, Mr. Russo has asserted two claims of error.
First, he has argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone video
discovered through a search of a cell phone found on his. person.
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Second, he has

contended that the district court erred in allowing the State to present irrelevant, highly
prejudicial evidence concerning his deviant sexual interests.
Mr. Russo's appeal was originally assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which
affirmed his convictions. See generally State v. Russo, 2013 Opinion No. 15 (Mar. 4,

2013) (hereinafter Opinion). With regard to the Fourth Amendment "search" issue, the
Court of Appeals held that, even though officers had a warrant particularly describing
the places to be searched as Mr. Russo's residence and his motorcycle, the police were
nonetheless free to search-pursuant to the warrant-Mr. Russo's person and a phone
found on his person, where Mr. Russo was detained outside the residence (and not on
his motorcycle). (See Opinion, pp.3-6.) With regard to the issue concerning admission
of the pornography evidence, the Court of Appeals found no error under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 404. (See Opinion, pp.7-10.)
Mr. Russo seeks Idaho Supreme Court review in this case. Although he seeks
Idaho Supreme Court review of all issues, he contends that the most compelling reason
for review to be granted can be found in the Court of Appeals' handling of the Fourth
Amendment issue. Specifically, he contends that the Court of Appeals' Opinion on this
issue is in conflict with United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho
Court of Appeals precedent, as well as the plain language of the Fourth Amendment
itself, insofar as it holds that a reviewing court may expand the scope of a search
warrant beyond its plain language under the guise of giving that warrant a
"commonsense" interpretation. Mr. Russo contends that this' holding is plainly incorrect
and, if allowed to stand, would undermine not only the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but also the preference for warrants generally.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the pre-dawn hours of August 27, 2009, J.W. was raped at knifepoint by a
masked man in her Nampa apartment. (See 8/2/10 Tr., p.200, L.18 - p.220, L.15.)1
When her assailant left, J.W. quickly called 9-1-1 to report the crime. (8/2/10 Tr., p.191,
L.17 - p.193, L.2 (testimony of police dispatcher), p.220, L.16 - p.221, L.2, p.22, Ls.2-4
(testimony of J.W.); Ex. 1 (recording of 9-1-1 call).)
The investigating officers who responded to J.W.'s report immediately decided
that Michael Russo would be their suspect. 2 (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.289, Ls.18-22.) They
quickly set up surveillance at his Meridian residence (8/3/10 Tr., p.289, L.24 - p.290,
L.9, p.294, L.6 - p.296, L.21, p.350, L.7 - p.352, L.23) and, before too long, went about
securing a search warrant for that residence (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.380, L.19 - p.381, L.18.)
That warrant, authorizing searches of Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle, was
eventually issued by an Ada County magistrate. (See R., pp.133-34; 8/3/10 Tr., p.381,
Ls.15-17.)
While officers had Mr. Russo's residence under surveillance (and before the
search warrant had arrived), they observed Mr. Russo leave his residence three timesonce to go behind his apartment building, and twice to check his mailbox. (R., p.142.)
The third time Mr. Russo left his apartment, which was some time shortly before noon,

There are a large number of separately-bound transcripts in the record on appeal in
this case. Accordingly, transcripts are identified herein based on the date of the hearing
in question.
2 Mr. Russo was convicted of rape in Washington in 1995. (R., p.129.) Based largely
on this fact, he would contend, once he moved to Idaho, he became the "usual suspect"
for any rape or seemingly related crime in the Meridian/Nampa area. (See R., pp.12531 (police affidavit outlining the various crimes that Mr. Russo was accused of
committing prior to this case coming about).) Notably, prior to this case coming about,
Mr. Russo had not been charged with any of the Idaho crimes for which he had been
accused.
1
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at least two detectives seized, and then searched, him as part of what they referred to
as "an investigatory detention.,,3 (R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, Ls.19-23, p.70,
Ls.13-14, 17-18.)

Although they had not observed Mr. Russo do anything illegal,

possess a weapon, or act in a threatening manner, the detectives immediately
handcuffed him; searched him, supposedly for weapons; removed his wallet from one of
his back pockets and his cell phone from one of his front pockets4 ; and then placed
Mr. Russo in a patrol car.

(R., pp.139, 142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.70, L.19.)

Approximately five minutes later, when another detective (Detective King) arrived,
Mr. Russo's cell phone was handed over to that detective. (R., p.142; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70,
Ls.21-25.) Thereafter, Det. King opened the phone and viewed its contents, supposedly
"to determine ownership" of the phone,5 whereupon he discovered a video believed to
have been taken of the rape of J.W. 6 (R., p.154; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.23 - p.71, L.2.) At
some point after that, based (at least in part) on the video found on his cell phone,
Mr. Russo was arrested. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.75, Ls.11-25, p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.6.) Also
based (at least in part) on the video found on the cell phone, the police obtained an

3 When Mr. Russo asked if he was being arrested, one of the officers told him he was
not; Detective Cain "told him it was called an investigatory detention." (R., p.142.)
4 Although the evidence before the district court at the time that Mr. Russo's
suppression motion was evaluated did not indicate whether Det. Cain knew that
Mr. Russo's wallet and cell phone were not weapons when he removed them from
Mr. Russo's pockets (see R., p.142), Det. Cain later testified at trial that he did know
what they were before he removed them from Mr. Russo's pockets. (See 8/3/10
Tr., p.356, Ls.1-4.)
5 At the time that it evaluated Mr. Russo's suppression motion, the evidence before the
district court-a sworn affidavit in support of an amended search warrant-indicated
that Det. King searched the phone's contents "to determine ownership." (R., p.154.) At
trial, however, Det. King testified that he searched Mr. Russo's phone "to see if there
was [sic] and photos or videos on there." (8/3/10 Tr., p.492, Ls.15-19.)
6 The 8-second video clip depicts a close-up view of a male and a female engaged in
vaginal intercourse. Because of the close-up view, no faces are visible and the
identities of the participants, therefore, are not readily apparent. (See Ex. 49.)
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amended warrant authorizing a search of that phone.

(See R, pp.153-54 (relevant

portion of affidavit in support of amended warrant), 155-57 (amended warrant).)
On September 3, 2009, a grand jury indicted Mr. Russo on one count of rape,
one count of first degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. (R, pp.10-12.)
On January 7, 2010, while he was awaiting trial, Mr. Russo filed, pursuant to the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article
I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, a motion to suppress, inter alia, the evidence
discovered on his cell phone?

(R., pp.73-75.)

Mr. Russo argued that neither his

detention and search, nor the search of his phone, was undertaken pursuant to a
warrant, and that they exceeded anything that might be permissible pursuant to the
Terf"'/ exception to the warrant requirement. (See R., pp.73-75.)

In response, the State filed a memorandum in opposition (see R, pp.100-05,
111-22), and provided a documentary record by which the district court could discern

Mr. Russo sought suppression of certain evidence on two other grounds (see
R, pp.73-80 (suppression motion challenging not only the search of the phone, but also
the issuance of the search warrants and procurement of certain statements made after
invocation of the right to silence/counsel)); however, because those suppression
arguments are not related to any issue raised on appeal, they are not discussed any
further herein.
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court, held as
follows:
7

where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id. at 30-31.
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the relevant facts (see R., pp.123-59 (exhibits 1 through 6, consisting of the affidavit in
support of the original search warrant, the original search warrant itself, a police report
prepared by Det. Palfreyman (one of the detectives who detained and searched
Mr. Russo), a police report prepared by Det. Cain (the other detective who detained and
searched Mr. Russo), the affidavit in support of the amended search warrant, and the
amended search warrant)9). The State argued that Mr. Russo was properly detained
because police can always detain the occupants of a residence while a search warrant
is being sought for that residence; however, the State made no attempt to argue that the
search of Mr. Russo's person and, subsequently, his phone, could have been proper.
(See R., pp.111-14.)

The State then argued that, even if the phone was searched

illegally, the fruits of the search were not subject to exclusion because of either the
attenuation doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, or the independent source
doctrine. (See R., pp.114-21.)
A lengthy hearing, consisting solely of arguments of counsel, was held on
Mr. Russo's suppression motion on January 27, 2010. (See generally 1/27/10 Tr.) At
that hearing, defense counsel argued, inter alia, that Mr. Russo's phone could not be
searched pursuant to the warrant authorizing a search of his home and motorcycle
because the phone was located on Mr. Russo's person, and his person was outside
when he was detained by the police. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.34: LS.18-25, p.51, Ls.16-20.)
In response, the State appears to have augmented the argument presented in its
briefing, this time asserting that the search of Mr. Russo's cell phone was permissible

9 Later, at the suppression hearing, the district court also ag'reed to take judicial notice
of the transcript of the grand jury proceedings in finding the relevant facts. (See 1/27/10
Tr., p.20, Ls.6-25.)
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because the original search warrant authorized a search for phones (implicitly
authorizing a search of those phones, the State argued) and, even if the original search
warrant did not authorize the search, the amended warrant specifically authorized a
search of that phone. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p.43, Ls.7-23.) The State also argued, as it had
in its briefing, that regardless of the legality of the search of the phone, "inevitably, that
cell phone would have been searched as Mr. Russo was being interviewed by Detective
Weekes" (1/27/10 Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6); however, the State never explained how it was that
an "investigatory detention" would have inevitably resulted in a search of Mr. Russo's
phone (see generally 1/27/10 Tr., p.41, L.21 - p.47, L.13).1O
The district court ruled on Mr. Russo's suppression motion from the bench at the
January 27, 2010 hearing. 11

(See 1/27/10 Tr., p.80, L.11 - p.83, L.23.) The district

court concluded that Mr. Russo was properly detained, but it did not reach the issue of
whether he (or his phone) was properly searched because the exclusionary rule would
not apply since the video on the phone would have inevitably been discovered.
(1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it was inevitable
that the video would have been discovered because, even though the first search
warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for phones

In its briefing, the State had argued that, even if the original search of the phone was
unconstitutional, because the police were specifically looking for a cell phone that might
contain photos or video of J.W.'s rape, having found a phone on Mr. Russo's person the
police inevitably would have sought a warrant authorizing a search of that phone.
~R., p.119.)
1 A few days later, the district court did enter a written order denying Mr. Russo's
motion; however, that order did not expand upon or clarify the district court's oral ruling,
as it simply incorporated the "factual findings and conclusions of the law" made on the
record at the hearing. (See R., p.166.)
10

7

and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 p.83, L.23.)
Also prior to trial, the State sought leave to offer extensive evidence of
Mr. Russo's alleged "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence
404(b). (See, e.g., R., pp.44-46 (original notice of intent to offer evidence under I.R.E.
404(b)), pp.47-51 (original motion in limine), pp.52-72 (memorandum in support of
original motion in limine), pp.85-88 (reply memorandum in support of original motion in
limine), pp.187 -227 (offer of proof in support of original motion in limine), p.237 (second

motion in limine), pp.228-35 (memorandum in support of second motion in limine).)
Among the evidence the State sought to have admitted under Rule 404(b) was
evidence that: (1) during a police interrogation, Mr. Russo had admitted to Detective
Weekes that he had sexual fantasies involving rape; and (2) certain pornographic
images depicting simulated rape were found in Mr. Russo's vehicle.

After extensive

proceedings on the State's proffered Rule 404(b) evidence, the district court ultimately
found the rape fantasy evidence, and some of the rape pornography evidence, to be
admissible.

(See 3/18/10 Tr., p.67, L.14 - p.69, L.9, p.77; L.25 - p.78, L.7 (fantasy

evidence), p.67, L.14 - p.68, L.10, p.78, Ls.7-10 (pornography evidence); 4/22/10 Tr.,
p.9, LS.6-11 (fantasy evidence); 5/11/10 Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.28, L.2, p.29, L.23 - p.31,
L.23 (pornography evidence); R., pp.175-76 (both fantasy and pornography evidence),
p.243 (pornography evidence).
Mr. Russo's case went to trial in August of 2010.

(See generally 8/2/10

Tr.; 8/3/10 Tr.; 8/4/10 Tr.; 8/5/10 Tr.) At trial, the cell phone video was admitted in two

8

different forms. 12 First, Exhibit 47, a video made by the Idaho State Police as officers
went through the contents of the cell phone, including the video in question, was
admitted.

(See 8/3/10 Tr., p.494, L.2 - p.497, L.15; Ex. 47.)

Next, Exhibit 49, an

"enhanced" version of the video, complete with still captures of certain frames, was
admitted. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.502, L.3 - p.511, L.11; Ex. 49.) In addition, there was
substantial argument and testimony regarding the video. (See, e.g., 8/2/10 Tr., p.185,
LS.14-20 (prosecutor's opening statement referencing the video and asserting that it
"shows the defendant raping [J.W.]"); 8/2/10 Tr., p.226, Ls.1-19 (J.W.'s testimony that
Det. King showed her a video, and that she identified herself in that video because "I
know my vagina, and I know just how I am. I just knew it was me"); 8/3/10 Tr., p.492,
LS.20-25 (Det. King describing the contents of the video); 8/3/10 Tr., p.511, L.21 p.512, L.5 (Det. King identifying certain characteristics of the female in the video);
8/4/10 Tr., p.91, L.17 - p.94, L.10 (Dr. Lisa Minge discussing the physiology of the
female in the video, comparing it to that of J.W., and offering her expert opinion that
J.W. is the female in the video); 8/4/10 Tr., p.155, Ls.15-24, p.159, LS.9-20
(prosecutor's closing argument reminding the jurors of the video and arguing that
Mr. Russo and J.W. are the two individuals depicted therein).)
Also admitted at Mr. Russo's trial was evidence and argument concerning
Mr. Russo's rape fantasies and his alleged possession of pornography depicting

All of the exhibits in this case which contain sexual content, i.e., Exhibits 4-6 (photos
of the victim's pubic area), Exhibit 47 (video of officers going through Mr. Russo's cell
phone), Exhibit 49 ("enhanced" video from Mr. Russo's cell phone), Exhibit 51
(pornography allegedly found in Mr. Russo's car), were originally retained by the district
court. However, on March 20, 2012, Mr. Russo filed a motion to augment the record
with these exhibits, and to have them transported to the Supreme Court (and held under
seal). That motion was granted by this Court on April 16, 2012.
12
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simulated rapes.

With regard to the fantasies, the State offered the testimony of

Del. Weekes, who detailed Mr. Russo's statements on this topic:
Q. . . .. Did you and Mr. Russo have a conversation with regards

to pornography?

A. Yes, we did.
Q. And can you briefly describe what you were talking about-or I'll

back up.
What type of pornography did he describe?

A. He described watching pornography that depicted rape.
Q. And did he tell you what happens when he watches this type of

pornography?

A. He did. He told me that it turns him on and it makes him want to
have sex.
Q. Did he, in your conversation, provide to you when he first started
viewing this type of pornography?

A. He did. Mr. Russo explained to me that he believed he was
approximately 15 or 16 years old the first time he saw a video that
depicted rape. And he described that portion of that video to me.
Q. And what was his description?

A. He told me that the video was a female that a male had taken
out into the desert, and he had began raping this female. And in the
video, during the rape, the female decided that she liked it and became
happy and wanted to become a participant in it. And that's how he
described that video taking place.
Q. And did he go further and to say what type of fantasies were

developed from watching this video?

A. He talked-he talked to me about his fantasies that he had, yes.
Q. And what were those fantasies, detective?

.

A. He told me he had abnormal violent sexual fantasies.
Q. And can you briefly go into the conversation that you had with
Mr. Russo and what he told you?
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A. I was talking to him about his fantasies and explained to him-I
told him that he didn't have fantasies like everybody else did. And he told
me he had abnormal sexual fantasies. And I told him he had violent
sexual fantasies. And initially, he told me he didn't. And I said, "Mike,
rape is violent." And he said, "you're right. Rape is violent. I shouldn't
deny that. I have violent abnormal sexual fantasies." But he minimized it
by saying that but [sic] his fantasies-his words are he minimized that
because at least in his fantasies, he wasn't hitting or punching someone.
Q. And did he go further into any specifics of what type of fantasy,

exactly, that he had?
A. He did. He told me that he had a fantasy about raping a woman,
and in the middle of it, she would decide she wanted it, and would
basically become a willing participant in that.
(8/4/10 Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.42, L.9.)
With regard to the pornography, the State offered Exhibits 50 (a photo of
Mr. Russo's Mazda 626) and 51 (printed pornographic images depicting simulated rape)
through Detective King, who testified that the pornography was found in Mr. Russo's
Mazda 626, along with registration and insurance paperwork for that vehicle showing
Mr. Russo as the owner of that vehicle. 13 (See 8/3/10 Tr.,p.513, L.13 - p.517, L.11,
p.549, L.10-18.) Further, although the jurors could certainly have evaluated Exhibit 51
for themselves, Det. King nevertheless described the pornographic images depicted
therein:
A male holding a female down by the shoulders as she's nude. Another
male penetrating her vagina with his penis. There's also another photo of
the same female, her mouth being penetrated by the male. . .. Bride
abuse is at the corner here, brideabuse.com. Well, I've seen this type of
picture before, and I know what Bride Abuse is, so you can't see dot-com,
but I believe it's brideabuse.com.

Detective King also testified about
Cherokee (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.517, L.22
testimony was later stricken based on
that vehicle (see 8/4/10 Tr., p.96, L.22
Ls.9-25).
13

rape pornography allegedly found in a Jeep
- p.523, L.11, p.549, Ls.19-24); however, that
the tenuousness of Mr. Russo's connection to
- p.104, L.25, p.105, L.20 - p.1 06, L.6, p.109,
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(8/3/10 Tr., p.516, Ls.16-25.)
Finally, in its closing argument, the State referenced both the rape fantasies and
the rape porn as follows: "[R]eturn to what Detective Weekes and her conversations
with Mr. Russo about his sexual fantasies, how this makes him feel powerful, how it
makes him feel in control, these rapes. He watches the pornography. It has the rape in
it." (8/4/10 Tr., p.159, Ls.3-8.)
Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. (8/5/10 Tr., p.5, L.18 p.6, L.8; R. pp.369-70.) Thereafter, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence
of fixed life. (See 11/30/10 Tr., p.96, Ls.4-16; R, pp.413-14.) The district court then
entered its judgment of conviction on December 1,2010. (R, pp.413-14.)
On December 28,2010, Mr. Russo filed a notice of appeal. (R, pp.415-16.) On
appeal before the Court of Appeals, he argued that the district court erred in failing to
suppress the cell phone video, and in allowing the State to offer evidence and argument
concerning his deviant sexual interests.
On March 4, 2013, the Court of Appeal issued a published opinion affirming
Mr. Russo's conviction. (See generally Opinion.) With regard to the Fourth Amendment
"search" issue, the Court of Appeals held that, even though officers had a warrant
particularly describing the places to be searched as Mr. Russo's residence and his
motorcycle, the police were nonetheless free to search-pursuant to the warrantMr. Russo's person and a phone found on his person, even though Mr. Russo was
detained outside the residence (and not on his motorcycle).

(See Opinion, pp.3-6.)

With regard to the issue concerning admission of the pornography evidence, the Court
of Appeals relied on State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct. App. 2009), and People v.
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Pe/o, 942 N.E.2d 463 (III. Ct. App. 2010), to hold, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b),

that the pornographic material depicting simulated rape and the testimony concerning
Mr. Russo's rape fantasies were "relevant to prove Russo's motive, intent, or plan," and
were not so unfairly prejudicial that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
them. (See Opinion, pp.7-10.)
Mr. Russo seeks Idaho Supreme Court review in this case. Although he seeks
Idaho Supreme Court review of all issues, he contends that the most compelling reason
for review to be granted can be found in the Court of Appeals' handling of the Fourth
Amendment issue. Specifically, he contends that the Court of Appeals' Opinion on this
issue is in conflict with United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho
Court of Appeals precedent, as well as the plain language of the Fourth Amendment
itself, insofar as it holds that a reviewing Court may expand the scope of a search
warrant beyond its plain language under the guise of giving that warrant a
"commonsense" interpretation. Mr. Russo contends that this holding is plainly incorrect
and, if allowed to stand, would undermine not only the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but also the preference for warrants generally.

ISSUES
1.

Are there special and important reasons for review to be granted in this case?

2.

Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video discovered by police in an
unconstitutional search of Mr. Russo's cell phone?

3.

Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence
concerning Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interests?

13

ARGUMENT
I.

There Are Special And Important Reasons For Review To Be Granted In This Case
A.

Introduction
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only

"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court. I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered
though.

Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be

considered in evaluating any petition for review:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression;
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior

decisions;
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further

appellate review is desirable.
I.A.R. 118(b).
Mr. Russo contends that there are special and important reasons for review to be
granted in this case.

Most importantly, the Court of Appeals' handling of the

suppression issue in this case is in conflict with precedent from this Court, the United
States Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals itself, as well as the plain language of
the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the Court of Appeals' handling of the Rule 404(b)
issue is in conflict with precedent.
14

B.

The Court Of Appeals' Handling Of The Suppression Issue Is In Conflict With
Precedent. As Well As The Plain Language Of The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(emphasis added). Based on this clear language, it would seem to be self-evident that,
if the search of a place is to be justified under a given warrant, that place must have
been "particularly describ[ed]" in that warrant.
In this case, although the warrant at issue particularly described the places to be
searched as Mr. Russo's residence and his motorcycle,14 the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that a search of Mr. Russo's person and the cell phone found on his
person (even though Mr. Russo was seized while outside of his residence, and not on
his motorcycle) was also justified under that warrant. (Opinion, pp.3-6.) The Court of

14 The original warrant described the places to be searched as follows:
Residence: 818 W. 8th Street, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
The
residence sits at the dead end of Northwest 8th Street in Meridian and
faces West. The residence is a four-plex with a brown shingle roof. The
front of the residence has brick on it. The sides of the house are a pale
white wood. The residence has the silver metal numbers 818 affixed to a
brown piece of wood on the front of the residence to the left of the door.
The residence has a white door. There is a stairwell on the south and
east side of the four-plex. The residence of 818 is located on the bottom
floor of the four-plex and is on the left side if you are facing the house from
Northwest 8th Street.
Motorcycle: a 1983 Black Harley Davidson Motorcycle. The license plate
number is MRE345. The motorcycle is registered to Michael Russo.

(R., p.134.) The warranted then concluded by commanding law enforcement "to make
immediate search of the above-described premises . . . . " (R., p.134 (emphasis
added).)
15

Appeals reasoned that Mr. Russo was properly detained and frisked for weapons 15 and,
although "[t]he search still occurred outside the apartment described in the warrant and
the individual was not identified as a person to be searched," because the search
warrant identified a cell phone as an item to be searched for, "once the detectives
identified the object in Russo's pocket as a cell phone during a lawful frisk, 2
commonsense reading of the scope of the search warrant allowed them to retain the
cell phone and search its contents." (Opinion, pp.5-6 (emphasis added)). Further, the
Court of Appeals remarked that, even had the officers not had a basis to frisk Mr. Russo
for weapons, "it is arguable that the police would have been justified to search Russo's
person for the phone under the scope of the warrant .... " (Opinion, p.6 n.2.) Key to
the Court of Appeals' conclusion in this regard, apparently, were: (a) its assumption
that, had Mr. Russo been detained inside his residence, he undoubtedly would have
been subject to search under the warrant; and (b) its distaste for the notion "that by
stepping outside of his apartment, [Mr. Russo] crossed a threshold that somehow
provided him with greater protection than would have been available if he were inside
his residence." (Opinion, p.6 n.2.)
Mr. Russo respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals' conclusion and
analysis are flawed; he contends that they represent a misreading of the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement and a dramatic diminution of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant preference. As such, the Court of Appeals' Opinion is in conflict

15 Mr. Russo has conceded that he was properly detained pursuant to Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); however, he has argued that a frisk for weapons was
not permissible under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and, even if it were permissible,
a search along the lines contemplated in Terry certainly could not have justified the
officers' search of his cell phone.
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with precedent from this Court, the United States Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals itself.
As noted above, the plain language of the Fourth Amendment clearly and
unequivocally requires that, if a search of a place is to be justified under a certain
warrant, that place must have been "particularly describ[ed]" in the warrant relied upon.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Indeed, the "particularly" language of the Fourth
Amendment is specifically directed at the "place to searched ," suggesting that the place
particularly described must be the place actually searched. Thus, Professor LaFave
has explained that, "[a] search made under authority of a search warrant may extend to
the entire area covered by the warrant's description." Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.10(a), at _ (5th ed. 2012). "The first

inquiry, therefore, is whether the place searched reasonably appeared to be the place
described." Id. § 4.10(a) at _

n.4. Under Professor LaFave's reasoning, if the place

actually searched does not fall within the description of the place described in the
warrant, the search cannot be upheld under that warrant.
The scant case law on this subject supports this analysis.

In United States v.

Johnson, 640 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2011), for example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

explicitly held that "[t]he authority to search granted by any warrant is limited to the
specific places described in it and does not extend to additional or different places." Id.
at 845 (quoting United States v. Pennington, 287 F.3d 739, 744 (8 th Cir. 2002)).
Likewise, in State v. Mathison, 263 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 1978), the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that "officers executing a search warrant are, and ought to be, strictly
limited to searching only the premises particularly described in the warrant. It is
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constitutionally impermissible to search one place under a warrant describing another
place or to seize one item under a warrant naming another item." Id. at 63.
Most importantly, perhaps, in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the
United States Supreme Court addressed the argument advanced by the Court of
Appeals in this case, and it rejected that argument out of hand, albeit in dicta.

In

Summers, officers arrived at a residence with a search warrant, intending to search the

residence for illegal drugs. Id. at 693. When they arrived, they saw Summers, who
turned out to be the owner of the residence, walk out the front door and down the front
steps of the porch. Id. The police detained him while they searched the residence;
later, after having found drugs in the search of the residence, they arrested Summers,
searched his person, and found additional drugs in his coat pocket. Id. In reviewing
Summers' suppression motion, the Supreme Court stated the following:
The dispositive question in this case is whether the initial detention
of respondent violated his constitutional right to be. secure against an
unreasonable seizure of his person. The State attempts to justify the
eventual search of respondent's person by arguing that the authority to
search premises granted by the warrant implicitly included the authority to
search persons on those premises, just as that authority included an
authorization to search furniture and containers in which the particular
things described might be concealed. But as the Michigan Court of
Appeals correctly noted. even if otherwise acceptable. this argument could
not justify the initial detention of respondent outside the premises
described in the warrant. See [People v. Summers,] 68 Mich. App., at
578-580, 243 N.W.2d, at 692-693-C 6 ]

The Michigan Court of Appeals' analysis of this issue. seemingly endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court, was as follows:
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The prosecutor argues in the alternative that. the courts of other
states have allowed the search of individuals found on the premises to
prevent the complete frustration of the warrant. Otherwise, it is claimed,
occupants would simply conceal contraband upon their person as the
police announce their presence. Applying the test found in those cases,
the prosecutor states that there was "reasonable cause" for the police to
18

Summers, 452 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court was clearly of

the view that, where officers have a valid warrant authorizing the search of a residence,
they are not free to search beyond the place particularly described in the warrant by
searching someone found outside the residence, even though that person is the owner
of the residence for which the warrant was issue, and even though the evidence sought
is of such a nature that it is just as likely to be on the person of the individual searched
as it is to be inside the residence.
Accordingly, where, as here, the search warrant unambiguously describes the
discreet places to be searched, the police are not free to expand the scope of their
search beyond the places particularly described in the warrant based solely on their
belief that the evidence they seek is located nearby-even if their belief is reasonable.17

believe defendant had upon his person property subject to the warrant.
Particular accent is put on defendant's presence on the scene and his
ownership of the house.
Our courts have never explored the extent to which persons found
upon the premises as a search warrant is executed can be searched
without another warrant. This is not the occasion to decide that issue, for
all of the cited cases require at the very least presence upon the premises
being searched. That factor cannot be found here. The defendant was
stopped outside of the house. There hardly could be any items on his
person which were subject to the search warrant, since the items too were
outside the designated premises. Taking defendant back inside did not
change the situation. Even if the police acted legally in doing so, an issue
we do not decide here, failure to search defendant's person certainly
would not "frustrate" the execution of the warrant. There could be little fear
that items in the house would be taken and concealed by defendant, who
was being detained and watched by Officer Conant.
People v. Summers, 243 N.W.2d 689, 692-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
17 When it comes to searches undertaken pursuant to warrants (or later sought to be
justified as having been undertaken to warrants), police officers in the field do not get to
decide whether probable cause exists; that is a decision for a neutral and detached
magistrate. As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
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In this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that because Mr. Russo
was close to his residence, and perhaps his motorcycle, and because it was reasonable
for the officers to believe that the evidence they sought could be found on his person,
the scope of the warrant could be expanded to Mr. Russo's person and the items found
thereon. (See Opinion, p.6 & n.2.) In doing so, the Court of Appeals relied on two of its
prior cases where it had held that "[i]n general, courts should avoid hypertechnicality
when interpreting warrants" and that "[w]arrants should be viewed in a commonsense
and realistic fashion." (Opinion, p.6 (citing State v. Sapp, 110 Idaho 153, 155 (Ct. App.
1986), and State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 388 (Ct. App. 1985), respectively)). But the
authorities relied upon are inapposite. In both Sapp and Holman, the relevant question
was whether the search warrants at issue were sufficiently specific in identifying the
places to be searched in order for the warrants to be valid on their faces. Sapp, 110
Idaho at 154-56; Holman, 109 Idaho at 388.

In both cases, the Court of Appeals

recognized that a search warrant need not contain a technical legal description of the
place to be searched; in both cases, it held that as long as the warrant contains a
description sufficient for the place to be searched to be located and distinguished from

The point of the Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will
justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers .... When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, (1948) (footnotes omitted).
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surrounding areas, the warrant is valid on its face. Sapp, 110 Idaho at 155-56; Holman,
109 Idaho 3SS. Likewise, in United States v. Ventrasca, 3S0 U.S. 102 (1965), the key
case relied upon by the Court of Appeals in both Sapp and Holman, the United States
Supreme Court was discussing the validity of search warrants when it commented on
how the warrant process should be "commonsense and realistic." Ventrasca, 3S0 U.S.
at 10S.

Further, when the Court made this comment, it was discussing affidavits

submitted in support of search warrants, not search warrants themselves. 18 Id. Thus,
the fact is that neither Sapp, nor Holman, nor Ventrasca supports the proposition that a
valid search warrant, particularly describing the places to be searched, may be
expanded to include places not described therein, simply because common sense
dictates that the evidence sought may be found in those other places. 19
Furthermore, Mr. Russo submits that, to the extent that the place(s) named in a
search warrant are subjective to interpretation by a reviewing court, they should not be
18

The relevant passage from Ventrasca is as follows:
These decisions reflect the recognition that the Fourth Amendment's
commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not
abstract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the
constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one
involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in
a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by
nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical
requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law
pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative
attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police
officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.

Ventrasca, 3S0 U.S. at 10S.
19 The reality is that if common sense dictates that the evidence sought could likely have
been found on Mr. Russo's person, the State could simply have sought a warrant
authorizing a search of his residence, his motorcycle, and his person. Recognizing this
reality, the Court of Appeals took the opportunity to "suggest that, in the future, "a
search warrant specifically include the person in instances where the warrant identifies
a particular premises and items typically found on a person known to reside there."
(Opinion, p.6 (emphasis in original).)
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interpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with their plain language.

Cf. Verska v.

Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93 (2011) (holding that statutes
which are clear on their face are not subjected to judicial interpretation; rather, the clear
language itself is controlling). And, in this case, the scope of the search warrant was
exceptionally clear; it covered Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle, and nothing more.
(See note 14, supra.) Thus, it left no room for "interpretation," i.e., expansion by the
Court of Appeals.
Because the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case represents a retrospective rewriting (and expansion) of the scope of the relevant search warrant, it flies in the face of
the Fourth Amendment itself, as well as precedent interpreting the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, there are special and important reasons for review to be granted in this
case.
C.

The Court Of Appeals' Handling Of The Rule 404(b) Evidence Is In Conflict With
Precedent
Although the Court of Appeals' handling of the suppression issue is the most

glaring error in the Court of Appeals' Opinion, Mr. Russo contends that the Opinion is
also in conflict with precedent in its handling of the evidence of Mr. Russo's deviant
sexual interests under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404.
The Court of Appeals held that evidence of Mr. Russo's sexual fantasies
involving rape, and his possession of pornographic images depicting simulated rape,
"was relevant to prove Russo's motive, intent, or plan." (Opinion, p.9.) This holding
was based on its prior decision in State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct. App. 2009)
(finding that incest stories were relevant to show the defendant's intent in molesting his
daughter), rev. denied, and the Illinois Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Pelo, 942
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N.E. 2d 463 (III. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that rape fantasy pornography was relevant in a
rape case because that pornography "involved acts and scenarios that were emulated
by the perpetrator"). (Opinion, pp.8-9.) Apparently, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
because Mr. Russo is sexually aroused by rape scenarios (real or simulated), that fact
somehow proves his motive, intent, or plan to rape J.W. in this case. (See Opinion,
pp.7-10.)
The flaw in the Court of Appeals' analysis is that it relies on a general trait of the
defendant (his sexual fascination with rape), as evidenced by his prior misdeeds
(possession of not only pornography, but of particularly offensive pornography, as well
as his deviant sexual fantasies) for the assumption that he acted in conformity therewith
(in raping J.W.).

In other words, the Court of Appeals' Opinion reasons that, if

Mr. Russo is the kind of man who would fantasize about rape, he must be the kind of
man who would want to, or would plan to, commit an actual rape. But this is precisely
the logical misstep that was cautioned against in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (2008),
where this Court held that "Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted
pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its
tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." Id. at
54; accord State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 (2010); State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho

459,462-63 (Ct. App. 2010).
The fact is that, in this case, there is no objective link, other than propensity,
between Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interest in rape, and the rape of J.W.

See

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668 ("The events must be linked by common characteristics that

go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to
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establish that the same person committed the acts.").

Accordingly, the Court of

Appeals' conclusion that evidence of Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interests was relevant
to show his motive, intent, or plan to rape J.W. is in conflict with precedent from this
Court, as well as the Court of Appeals itself. This is another reason why review should
be granted in this case.
II.
The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Video Discovered In An
Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Russo's Cell Phone

A.

Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following

guarantee:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.20

This text embodies a Constitutional preference that

governmental searches and seizures be undertaken pursuant to warrants. Thus, it has
been held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

"The burden of proof rests with the State to

demonstrate that [a given warrantless] search either fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the

20 The Idaho Constitution provides a guarantee that is virtually identical to that of the
Fourth Amendment. See IDAHO CONST. Article I § 17.
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circumstances." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). Traditionally, it has been
held that if the State fails to meet its burden in this regard, and the search in question is
determined to be unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule precludes the State from using
its ill-gotten evidence against the defendant at trial. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,
915 (Ct. App. 2006); see a/so Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (referring to the
exclusionary rule

as "an

essential part of both

the

Fourth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments").
In this case, the district court did not reach the issue of whether Mr. Russo or his
phone were improperly searched; instead, it ruled that even if the searches were
undertaken in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would not apply
since the video found on the phone would have inevitably been discovered by the police
anyway. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.) The district court reasoned that it was
inevitable that the video would have been discovered because, even though the first
search warrant had not arrived yet, it had been issued and it authorized a search for
phones and implicitly authorized a forensic search of those phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81,
L.22 - p.83, L.23.)
Mr. Russo submits that the district court's ruling was in error. Below, he explains
why the searches of his person and his phone violated the Fourth Amendment.
Thereafter, he explains why the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule
does not apply and why the proper remedy for the Fourth Amendment violations,
therefore, was exclusion of the ill-gotten evidence.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The appellate court

must accept those of the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by
substantial evidence, but it can freely review the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561 (Ct. App. 1996).
C.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video
As noted, Mr. Russo contends that the officers' search of his person, then his cell

phone, was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. This is so for three reasons:
first, although a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the search of his residence and
motorcycle, that warrant did not extend to a search of his person where he was
detained outside of his residence; second, the Terry exception to the warrant
requirement cannot justify a search of Mr. Russo's person under the facts of this case
and, even if it could, the search of Mr. Russo's phone was not a valid Terry search;
third, because Mr. Russo was not arrested until after his phone was searched (and his
arrest was based, at least in part, on what was discovered on his phone), the search of
his person and his phone cannot be justified under the "search incident to arrest"
exception to the warrant requirement.
Mr. Russo further contends that, because discovery of the cell phone video was
not inevitable under the facts of this case, the exclusionary rule applies such that the
district court erred in failing to suppress the fruits of the officers' unconstitutional search
of his phone.
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1.

Even If Mr. Russo Was Properly Detained While Officers Obtained And
Executed A Search Warrant For His Residence, He Could Not Be
Searched Pursuant To That Warrant

Michigan v. Summers involved facts analogous, in many respects, to those in this

case. In Summers, police were preparing to execute a search warrant on a residence
when they encountered the owner of the house heading down his front steps; the
officers detained him and, eventually, searched him (finding contraband on his person).
Summers, 452 U.S. at 693.

The question in that case was whether the Fourth

Amendment permits officers to temporarily detain the occupant of a residence while
they search the house pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate. State v. Summers,
452 U.S. at 702-703. The Supreme Court held that it does. Id. at 705.
In light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Summers, therefore,
there is little doubt that the police in this case were acting within the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment when they detained Mr. Russo outside his home as they obtained
and executed a search warrant for his home. See id.; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326, 331-34 (2001) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the detention of the
occupant outside of his home (in what was less than a full arrest) while a search warrant
was being obtained).
However, just because Mr. Russo could be detained to: (1) "prevent[ ] flight in
the event that incriminating evidence is found"; (2) "minimize[d] the risk of harm to the
officers"; and (3) facilitate "the orderly completion of the search," i.e., provide access to
the police so that they did not destroy his residence, Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, that
does not mean that he could also be searched. In fact, the Summers Court spoke to
this very issue and made it clear that because the occupant was found outside the place
or thing to be searched pursuant to the warrant, i.e., the residence, the warrant itself did
27

not allow for a search of his person while he was being detained. Id. at 694. The Court
stated as follows:
The State attempts to justify the eventual search of respondent's person
by arguing that the authority to search premises granted by the warrant
implicitly included the authority to search persons on those premises, just
as that authority included an authorization to search furniture and
containers in which the particular things described might be concealed.
But ... even if otherwise acceptable, this argument could not justify the
initial detention of respondent outside the premises described in the
warrant.
Id. (emphasis added).

Because a search warrant does not extend beyond the place or thing to be
searched, see id., and because the original search warrant in this case authorized only
the searches of Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle (R., p.134), the search of
Mr. Russo's person (and, by extension, the phone found on his person), while he was
outside his residence, was clearly not conducted in accordance with the warrant. 21
Thus, that search is presumptively unconstitutional and it is the State's burden to
demonstrate that a well recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies.
2.

Even If Mr. Russo Was Validly Detained, Under The Standards Set Forth
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), There Was No Basis To Search Him
For Weapons And, Even If There Was, The Officers' Search Of
Mr. Russo's Phone Far Exceeded What Was Permissible Under Terry

When police officers detain occupants of residences being searched pursuant to
magistrate-issued warrants, they need not do so at undue personal risk. Thus, in
Muehler v.

Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005), the Supreme Court held that it was

constitutionally permissible for officers to handcuff and detain occupants of the

21 For further discussion of the scope of the search warrant, and the reasons why it
cannot be used to justify the relevant search in this case, see Part I(B), supra, which is
incorporated herein by this reference.
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residence being searched because, under the facts of that case, the execution of the
warrant was "inherently dangerous.,,22 Id. at 99-100.
Likewise, many courts have held that it is constitutionally permissible for officers
to frisk the detained occupants of the residence being searched where the officers have
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the detainees are armed and dangerous. For
example, in Germany v. United States, 984 A.2d 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2009), the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that, under "the totality of the circumstances" (which included the
facts that officers were searching for both guns and drugs, it was dark, the officers were
badly outnumbered by the "partying" occupants, and the defendant was wearing a coat
under which a weapon could be concealed), the officers had a "reasonable, articulable
suspicion that appellant might be armed and dangerous," such that they "acted lawfully
in performing a pat-down frisk of appellant for weapons." Id. at 1228-30. The Germany
Court was very clear, however, in explaining that the "pat-down frisk" approved of was
no more intrusive than the limited search authorized in Terry, see id. at 1222 n.7, and
that, by approving of the pat-down frisk in that case, it most certainly was "not hold[ing]
that, in every case, police may frisk all occupants of a residence being searched
pursuant to a warrant" because, "[a]s Professor LaFave aptly puts it, 'it remains clear
that there is no authority justifying the police to "routinely" frisk those present at any
search warrant execution.'" Id. at 1230 n.19 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.9(d) (4th ed. Supp. 2009-10)).

Apparently, most jurisdictions are in accord with the D.C. Circuit on this issue.
See Germany, 984 A.2d at 1230 n.19 (compiling cases wherein other courts had
22 In Mena, officers were searching for weapons in the re~idence of a wanted gang
member, and the officers were outnumbered at a 2:1 ratio. Mena, 544 U.S. at 100.
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approved of Terry frisks of detainees at search warrant executions, based on the theory
that there was reasonable basis to believe that those detainees were armed and
dangerous). Certainly Idaho is one such jurisdiction. In State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643
(Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals applied the Terry standard to a situation in which,
while police were executing a warrant at a residence, an individual approached that
residence and was detained pursuant to Summers, supra. Id. at 459-61. The Court of
Appeals held that the subsequent frisk of that individual was constitutionally permissible
because, under the facts of that case (it was late at night; the individual supplied a
dubious explanation for why he was present; officers were investigating a suspected
guns-for-drugs operation; and the individual was wearing a "fanny pack" which could
have concealed a weapon), it was reasonable to believe that the individual was armed
and dangerous, and engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 461.
In light of this standard, the first question in this case is whether, when Detectives
Pelfreyman and Cain detained Mr. Russo, there was evidence to support a reasonable
articulable suspicion that he was armed and presently dangerous. Mr. Russo submits
that there was no such evidence. It was nearly noon, so lighting would not have been a
concern; Mr. Russo was alone and, therefore, outnumbered by the officers; Mr. Russo
was wearing jeans and a shirt (R., p.142) and, therefore, would have had little
opportunity to conceal a weapon; and Mr. Russo was already in handcuffs by the time
he was searched (see R., p.142), so even if he had a weapon, it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, to access and use effectively. Moreover, the district court
specifically found that "[t]he officers had not observed the defendant to do anything
illegal. The officers did not see the defendant with any weapon. And the officers did not
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see the defendant act in a threatening manner." (1/27/10 Tr., p.68, L.24 - p.69, L.2.)
The only fact which could have raised any security concern for the officers at all was
that J.W.'s rapist used a knife to gain her compliance; however, the officers would have
had no reason to suspect that (even assuming they had the right suspect in their midst)
Mr. Russo still had the knife on him, hours after the rape, as he checked his mail. In
short, there was no reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Russo was armed and
dangerous when he was detained by the police and, therefore, the search of his person
was impermissible under Terry and Kester.
Even if the pat-down frisk of Mr. Russo's person was somehow permissible
though, the fact is that once his cell phone was identified as such-and certainly once it
was removed from Mr. Russo's reach-it was not subject to further search.

First, a

phone is not a weapon, so once the item in Mr. Russo's pocket was identified as a
phone, the officers had no right to invade Mr. Russo's privacy further by seizing it or
searching its contents. State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730 (Ct. App. 2005) ("After
satisfying themselves that the item was a container and not a weapon, however, the
officers had no valid reason to further invade Faith's right to be free of police intrusion
absent reasonable cause to arrest him. . . . We conclude that the officers' removal of
the Altoids tin from Faith's person was beyond the permissible limits of Terry and was a
violation of Faith's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search.").
Second, even if the cell phone itself is considered to be a weapon, the data
stored on a cell phone is not, under any circumstances, a weapon. Accordingly, an
officer would never be within his rights to peruse the contents of a cell phone as part of
a protective frisk. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 ("The sole justification of the search in the
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present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.").
Third, to the extent that a cell phone or its contents could somehow be construed
as posing a threat to the detaining officers, as soon as that phone was taken out of
Mr. Russo's reach, it ceased to be a threat and, therefore, could not be searched
further. See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730-31 (holding that even if officers were concerned
that an Altoids tin might contain a weapon, once that tin was removed from the
handcuffed suspect's reach, it could no longer be construed as posing a threat and,
therefore, "[t]he opening of the box and inspection of its contents was unlawful").

In

other words, as soon as the risk attendant to the item in question abates, so too does
the justification for the search of that item. See id.; cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
343 (2011) (making it clear that in a search incident to arrest, officers may search the
arrestee's vehicle for officer safety reasons only to the extent that the vehicle, and any
weapons that may be contained therein, are reasonably within the arrestee's reach).
In light of the foregoing, it is incontrovertible that the removal of the cell phone
from Mr. Russo's pants pocket, and the subsequent search of the data stored on that
cell phone, cannot be justified under the Terry frisk exception to the warrant
requirement. Accordingly, the State failed to establish that a well-recognized exception
to the warrant requirement applies in this case and it is apparent that Mr. Russo's rights
were violated.
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3.

Because Mr. Russo Was Not Arrested Until After His Phone Was
Searched (And His Arrest Was Based, At Least In Part, On The Evidence
Discovered On His Phone), The Search Of His Person And His Phone
Cannot Be Justified Under The "Search Incident To Arrest" Exception To
The Warrant Requirement

For the first time on appeal, the State has argued that the search of Mr. Russo's
person, and the cell phone found on his person, was justified under the "search incident
to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-12.)
Preliminarily, it is important to note that, especially in the context of the Fourth
Amendment (because it is the State that bears the burden of proving that a given
warrantless search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,290 (1995)), the State is notfree to raise
new arguments for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho
509, 515 n.4 (2010) (identifying the rule that Idaho's appellate courts "will not consider
issues not raised in the court below," and suggesting that that rule generally applies to
the State when it is the respondent on appeal, just as it does to the defendantappellant); State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 81-82 (2000) (rejecting the State's attempt to
argue for the first time on a appeal that the defendant lacked "standing" to challenge the
search of his wife's purse); State v. Reimer, 127 Idaho 214,218-19 (1995) (rejecting the
State's attempt to argue for the first time on appeal that the search of a mug was
permissible under the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement). See also

Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56,57 (2006) ("Appellate court review is
'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented . . . below.'
Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time
on appeal.") (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Jones, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 945,
954 (2012) (rejecting the government's attempt to argue for the first time in the Supreme
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Court that placing a tracking device on a vehicle was lawful because the officers
possessed probable cause to believe that the defendant was "a leader in a large-scale
cocaine distribution conspiracy"; finding that because this argument was not addressed
below and, therefore, not addressed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, it was
forfeited).
To the extent, however, that this Court is willing to indulge the State's new
argument, it should reject it.

The State's argument is essentially as follows:

(1)

although the police had absolutely no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest (as
they repeatedly described their detention of him as an "investigative detention," explicitly
told him that he was not under arrest, and explained that they searched him as part of a
weapons frisk), this Court should retrospectively characterize the encounter as an arrest
and a search incident to arrest; (2) in characterizing this encounter as an arrest and a
search incident to arrest, this Court should ignore the fact that Mr. Russo was arrested
primarily because of the fruits of the supposed "search incident to arrest," not based on
the evidence which caused the officers to seek a search warrant for Mr. Russo's
residence and motorcycle; (3) this Court should find that, if there is probable cause for
issuance of a search warrant for a home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest
the resident of that home; and (4) because Mr. Russo has not challenged on appeal the
magistrate's issuance of a search warrant, it is now "undisputed" that probable cause to
search and, therefore, to arrest, existed. (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) This entire argument is
premised on the assertion that the United States Supreme Court has held that a search
incident to arrest may "precede[ ] a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a
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suspect exists at the time of the search." (Resp. Br., p.11 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98,111 (1980)).
The flaws in the State's argument are legion.

First and foremost, the State's

argument is premised upon a somewhat misleading representation of United States
Supreme Court precedent. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court certainly held
that a search incident to arrest may precede formal arrest where probable cause to
arrest exists at the time of the search, Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111; however, the State
fails to mention that this is true only U[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the
heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person," id., and where the fruits of that
search do not serve as "part of' the justification for the arrest, Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S.
541, 543 (1990) (quoting Sib ron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968)); see also

Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111 n.6. See State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351 (Ct. App.
2008) ("So long as the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and the
fruits of the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest, the
search need not precisely follow the arrest in order to be incident to that arrest.").
In this case, the officers had no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest
initially; they only intended to detain him.

It was only because the phone was

discovered and searched, and potentially incriminating evidence was found on that
phone, that Mr. Russo was actually arrested.

Detective Cain, one of the two officers

who detained Mr. Russo, described the incident in her report as follows:
Cpl. Weekes stated that if he stepped outside if his residence again, he
needed to be detained ... , Mike exited his residence . . .. I detained
Mike with my handcuffs and told him he was being detained. He asked if
he was being arrested ofr] detained.
I told him it was called an
investigatory detention at this time. I then searched Mike to make sure he
didn't have anything sharp on him. He had a wallet in his right back
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pocket and a cell phone in his front right pocket. . .. I held onto Mike's
wallet and cell phone until I turned them over to Detective King when he
arrived on scene approximately 5 minutes after I detained him.
(R., p.142 (emphasis added).)

Detective King then searched the phone.

(See

R., p.104; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.21 - p.71, L.2.) The report of Detective Palfreyman is
consistent with that of Detective Cain:
Det. Cain advised me that she had been given the instructions that if the
suspect, Russo, came out of the residence again . . . that we were to
detain him for questioning . ....
At approximately 1150 hours Det. Cain advised me that she saw the
suspect leave the residence and head towards the mailboxes ....
Det. Cain and I then made contact with Russo at the mailbox area. He
was detained and placed into handcuffs. Det. Cain then searched him for
any weapons. We did not locate any weapons on him.23
(R., p.139 (emphasis added».
Further, a subsequent affidavit submitted in support of a request for a warrant
authorizing a search of the phone, which by then had already been searched by Det.
King, described the incident as follows:
[A] cellular phone was recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat
down search for officer safety. This phone was opened and looked at to
determine ownership. Your affiant knows that a video was located on that
phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's rape. At that
point the review of the cell phone's contents was stopped .... Your affiant
requests permission to search the entirety of the phone.
(R., p.154.)

Thus, Mr. Russo's arrest would not have followed on the heels of the

search of his person, but for discovery of the video found on the phone found on his

23 Det. Palfreyman's report makes no mention of the phone found in Det. Cain's search
of Mr. Russo's person, or Det. King's search of that phone a few minutes later.
(R., pp.139-40.)
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person?4

Accordingly, rather than presenting an argument that is consistent with

Supreme Court precedent, the State seeks to have this Court turn that precedent on its
head.
A second flaw in the State's position is that it has not, and indeed cannot, support
its contention that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for a
home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. However,
it simply cannot be said that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant
for a home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. See

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979) (holding that a search warrant authorizing a
search of a tavern and the person of the bartender did not establish probable cause to
search another patron found on the premises); United States v. Oi Re, 332 U.S. 581,
585-86 (1948) (holding that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile
exception does not allow for searches of the individuals riding therein).

Indeed, the

inquiry of whether probable cause exists to conduct a search is not identical to the
inquiry of whether probable cause exists to arrest. See State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
282 (Ct. App. 2005).25 If it were, and if probable cause to search necessarily gave rise

24 The district court noted that the search could not be justified as a search incident to
arrest because the subsequent arrest "was, in part, based on the items obtained at the
search." (1/27/10 Tr., p.82, LsA-6.)
25 In Gibson, the Court of Appeals explained as follows:
The standard of probable cause involves the same quantum of
evidence regardless of whether an arrest or a search is involved. United
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004). Nonetheless, the
facts needed to justify a search are different from those needed to justify a
seizure. Humphries, 372 F.3d at 659. Rather, each conclusion requires a
showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances.
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (3d ed.1996). The right to
arrest arises when a crime is committed or attempted in the officer's
presence whereas a search can be authorized when probable cause
37

to probable cause to arrest the homeowner (and search that homeowner incident to
arrest), in Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court would not have had to engage in
an analysis of whether the homeowner could be temporarily detained while the police
executed a search warrant at his residence; it simply could have held that, because a
magistrate had determined that there was probable cause to believe drugs were in
Summers' home, ipso facto, there was probable cause to arrest him and search him
incident to arrest. But, of course, that was not the holding of Summers; Summers was
far more limited. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05 ("If the evidence that a citizen's
residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an
invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that
citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home.
Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."); see also Bailey v.

United States, _

U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (reaffirming Summers, but declining

to expand it to allow for detentions of suspects not in the immediate vicinity of the
residence to be searched).

And, in Summers, the Court noted that Summers was

arrested (and searched incident to arrest), only after his home had been searched

demonstrates that an item connected with criminal activity will be found in
a certain location. Id. In the case of an arrest, the conclusion concerns the
guilt of the arrestee. LaFave, supra, at § 3.1 (b). Accordingly, although the
conclusions that justify a search or seizure must be supported by the
same degree of integrity, the conclusions themselves are not identical. Id.
Therefore, the existence of probable cause to search Gibson's vehicle
does not resolve whether there was probable cause to believe that Gibson
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance.

Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282.
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pursuant to a properly-executed search warrant and that search yielded additional
evidence to support a finding of probable cause to arrest Summers. See id. at 693 &
n.1.
The third flaw in the State's reasoning relates to the question of whether, given
the facts of this case, there was actually probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo. The State
claims that "it is undisputed in this case that the officers had, before they detained and
searched him, established probable cause to believe that Russo had committed several
rapes."

(Resp. Br., p.11 (emphasis added).)

As such, the State suggests that

Mr. Russo has implicitly conceded that there was probable cause to believe he
committed one or more rapes. The State's assertion, however, is misleading, and its
suggestion is false.
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo did not challenge the magistrate's finding of
probable cause to search his residence and, therefore, its issuance of the search
warrant.

However, this decision on Mr. Russo's part is in no way a concession that

probable cause-either to search or to arrest-existed. A forfeiture of a claim is far
different than a concession of that claim.

Thus, the fact that Mr. Russo has not

challenged the issuance of the search warrant in no way informs the question of
whether there was probable cause to arrest him.26 A more accurate assertion from the

26 There are any number of reasons why an appellate claim may be forfeited, see, e.g.,
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983) (recognizing that appellate counsel may,
for strategiC reasons, properly forgo colorable claims on appeal), not the least of which
is that a given claim may be subject to an unfavorable standard of review. Compare
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) ("[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo
review. A magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference
by reviewing courts.' 'A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants,' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches
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State would have been that, when Mr. Russo filed his original Appellant's Brief, it had
not yet been disputed on appeal that the officers had probable cause to believe that
Mr. Russo was a rapist. And, of course, the reason that this issue had not yet been
disputed on appeal is that the State's "search incident to arrest" argument was raised
for the first time on appeal.

Mr. Russo simply had no reason to argue that probable

cause was lacking prior to then. Accordingly, the State's suggestion that this appeal
can be resolved by reliance on a single fact-the fact that a warrant was issued for a
search of Mr. Russo's residence-should be rejected.
Turning then to the facts of this case, it is apparent that there was no probable
cause to support an arrest prior to discovery of the cell phone video. When police got
the call about J.W.'s rape, they immediately suspected Mr. Russo-not because they
had any evidence linking him to the crime, but because he was their usual suspect.
(See R, pp.131-32.)

Mr. Russo has a Washington conviction for rape (the rape

occurred in 1995). (R, pp.129-30.) In addition, he was a suspect in a bizarre home
invasion in Nampa in August 2008. (See R, pp.127-29.) He was not charged in that
case though. (R, p.78; see a/so R, pp.123-32.)

Thereafter, based on his prior

conviction and the suspicion that he was involved in the Nampa home invasion,

conducted pursuant to a warrant 'courts should not invalidate . . . warrant[s] by
interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.' ...
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of
an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination has been that so long as the
magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.") (Citations omitted),
and State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2004) (applying Gates' "substantial basis"
standard in reviewing the district court's decision to issue a search warrant), with
State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-53 (1989) (reviewing de novo the trial court's
determination that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant).
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Mr. Russo was identified as a suspect in a July 2009 rape in Fruitland. 27

(See R,

pp.125-27.) However, he had not been charged in that case either. (R, pp.78-79; see
also R, pp.123-32.)

The fact is that there was no direct evidence actually linking

Mr. Russo to either the Nampa incident or the Fruitland rape.

(See R, pp.125-31.)

Furthermore, the victim of the Nampa incident was shown at least three photo lineups
and one video lineup which included Mr. Russo, but she never identified him as her
attacker (R, p.78), and bystanders who saw the apparent assailant leaving the scene of
the Nampa incident indicated that Mr. Russo was not the man they saw (R, pp.78,
128).
The only new evidence that the police had when J.W. reported her rape in this
case was that, when the police went to the home of their 'usual suspect in the early
morning hours of August 29, 2009, the engine of his motorcycle was "extremely hot,"
indicating that it had recently been ridden, and the lights were on in Mr. Russo's
residence, indicating that Mr. Russo was awake early that morning. 28 (R, pp.131-32.)

While the Fruitland rape bore a couple of similarities (as well as a large number of
dissimilarities) to the rape Mr. Russo committed in Washington in 1995, the Nampa
incident bore no similarities. (R., pp.128-32.)
28 In its Respondent's Brief, the State suggested that the police had an additional piece
of evidence connecting Mr. Russo to the rape of J.W. It asserted that "[s]tarting around
6:00 [on the morning of J.W.'s rape] officers saw Russo making several trips to a
laundry room near his four-plex apartment where he started doing laundry, including
clothing matching the description provided by the victim of clothing worn by the rapist."
(Resp. Br., p.5; see also Resp. Br., p.13.) This suggestion was exceptionally
misleading. The record reveals only that, before they obtained a warrant to search
Mr. Russo's residence, officers saw him leave that residence and walk around his
building. There is no indication that the officers knew he was going to/from a laundry
room, and there is certainly no indication that the officers saw him carrying clothes fitting
the description provided by J.W. (See R, pp.145, 153-54. (application for amended
search warrant, indicating that it was only later that officers learned of the existence of
the laundry room, and seeking permission an amended warrant that would allow a
search of that laundry room).
27
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Mr. Russo submits that merely being the usual suspect, and having apparently been out
and about on the morning after the rape-with no evidence actually connecting him to
J.W., her residence (or even her city),29 or the crime-does not constitute probable
cause to arrest. 30 See Mary/and v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (discussing the
probable cause standard).

A hunch?

Definitely.

Reasonable articulable suspicion?

Perhaps. But probable cause? Most certainly not. 31
4.

Because The "Inevitable Discovery" Doctrine Has No Application In This
Case, The Exclusionary Rule Applies And The District Court Erred In
Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video

"The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and
bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to an illegal search." State v.
Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,915 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,496

(2001)). While there are some exceptions to the general rule requiring the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence, the State bears the burden of pleading or proving these
exceptions by a preponderance of the evidence.

See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,

444-45 & n.5 (1984).
One exception to the exclusionary rule is the so-called "inevitable discovery"
doctrine. See id. at 441-48. In order for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply, the
State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the information at issue

29 The rape was committed in Nampa, but Mr. Russo lived in Meridian.
30 Had the evidence concerning the other alleged crimes been sufficient to give rise to
probable cause, presumably Mr. Russo would have been arrested and charged for
those crimes.
31 Mr. Russo's contention that probable cause to arrest did not exist prior to discovery of
the cell phone video is supported by the State's candid concession below that, without
the video, it probably could not even take Mr. Russo's case to trial. (R., p.121.)
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would have independently been discovered through lawful means. Bunting, 142 Idaho
at 915.
In applying the inevitable discovery doctrine and determining whether the
evidence at issue would have inevitably been discovered through lawful means
independent of the illegal search, the reviewing court is not permitted to assume the
hypothetical of what would have been discovered had the officer acted lawfully. Rather,
there must be a showing that some other independent action was already taking place,
or had taken place, that would have revealed the same evidence. Id. at 916-917. The
Bunting Court made this abundantly clear:

The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that a
preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took
place, or was in the process of taking place, would have led to the
discovery of the evidence that was already obtained through unlawful
police action. The inevitable discovery doctrine was not intended to allow
a court to consider what actions the authorities should· or could have taken
and in doing so then determine that lawful discovery of the already
unlawfully obtained evidence would have been inevitable.
Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In fact,

more than 25 years ago, the Court of Appeals put it more bluntly: "The [inevitable
discovery] doctrine 'is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by
substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.'"

State v.

Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Judge Burnett's concurring

opinion in State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 226 (Ct. App. 1984)).

Thus, recently, in

State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163,170 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of Appeals declined to

apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule just because an
investigation may have reached the same result absent the Fourth Amendment
violation. The Liechty Court observed as follows:
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[T]he issue before us whether an additional line of investigation would
have revealed the [contraband], not whether the evidence would have
been discovered had the encounter between the officer and Liechty not
occurred while the officer was standing in the open passenger doorway
[the Fourth Amendment violation]. Indeed, we decline to predict how such
a conversation would have unfolded. The record does not disclose any
additional line of investigation and, as a result, the inevitable discovery
doctrine does not apply.
Liechty, 152 Idaho at 170.
In this case, the inevitable discovery doctrine has no application. The State's
argument below was that, even had the detectives not (impermissibly) searched
Mr. Russo's phone when they did, once they realized that he had a phone on his
person, they would have obtained a new search warrant (such as the amended warrant
that was actually issued in this case) authorizing a search of that phone. 32 (See 1/27/10
Tr., p.44, Ls.2-6; R, p.119.) This, however, would not have been an independent line of
investigation; it would have simply been a continuation of the already-existing line of
investigation, which does not satisfy the standards of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
See Liechty, 267 P.3d at 1285; Bunting, 142 Idaho at 916-917; Holman, 109 Idaho at
392.

Furthermore, simply asserting that, had the officers not searched the phone

illegally they would have obtained a warrant to search that phone is doing nothing more

Insofar as the State attempts to argue that the contents of the phone would have
inevitably been discovered because of issuance of the actual amended search warrant
in this case, that argument would be absurd because the State used the fruits of its
illegal search of that phone to obtain the amended warrant. (R., p.154 (stating in the
affidavit in support of the request for an amended warrant that "a cellular phone was
recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat down search for officer safety. This
phone was opened and looked at to determine ownership .. Your affiant knows that a
video was located on that phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's
rape. . .. Your affiant requests permission to search the entirety of the phone).) Not
only does this not satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine's requirement of an
independent line of investigation, but it also violates the basic principle that a search
that is unlawful at its inception cannot be validated by what it turns up. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963).
32
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substituting what the police should have done for what they really did. Again, this fails
to satisfy the standards of inevitable discovery doctrine. Holman, 109 Idaho at 392.
Likewise, the district court's application of the inevitable discovery doctrine was in
error, albeit for a different reason. This district court concluded that it was inevitable
that the cell phone video would have been discovered because, even though the
original search warrant had not arrived yet, that warrant had been issued and it
authorized a search for phones, which implicitly authorized a forensic search of those
phones. (1/27/10 Tr., p.81! L.22 - p.83, L.23.) Thus, the district court appears to have
assumed that, had the original search warrant been present on-scene, it would have
authorized a search of Mr. Russo's person and the cell phone kept on his person. (See
1/27/10 Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.83, L.23.)

However, this reason is flawed since, for the

reasons set forth in Parts 1(8) & II(C)(1), supra, a search warrant authorizing a search of
a residence does not extend to the person of someone detained outside the residence.
On appeal, the State again argued the inevitable discovery doctrine, but it did so
based on a wholly new theory. This time, the State placed no reliance on the search
warrants; instead, it argued that, even if the original search of Mr. Russo and his phone
was improper, because it was inevitable that he would have been arrested at some
point, it is likewise inevitable that his phone would have been seized and searched.
(Resp. 8r., pp.12-13.)

However, the reality is that the police did not have probable

cause to arrest Mr. Russo when they first arrived, and they did not discover sufficient
new evidence to give rise to probable cause to arrest him after they searched his home
and motorcycle.

As noted above, all police knew when they arrived at Mr. Russo's

residence was that he was their usual suspect, and that he had been out and about on
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his motorcycle early that morning. 33 Furthermore, when they executed their warrants,
they found only two items of interest-neither of which is particularly probative. First,
the officers found in the laundry room clothing supposedly matching that which was
worn by J.W.'s assailant. 34 However, the clothing found was far from a perfect match to
that which was described by J.W. Immediately after she was raped, J.W. called 9-1-1
and reported that her attacker had been wearing jean shorts (see 8/3/10 Tr., p.281, L.23
- p.282, L.1; Ex.1), but the clothes found in Mr. Russo's laundry room included fulllength jeans, not jean shorts (8/3/10 Tr., p.387, Ls.1-13).35 Second, although the police

33 The State claimed that the evidence showed that "Russo had driven his motorcycle a
considerable distance before 5:47 a.m. the morning of the rape" (Resp. Br., p.13);
however, this was fanciful speculation by the State. The evidence showed simply that
the motorcycle's engine was "extremely hot." (R., p.132.) There is no evidence in
record showing how hot "extremely hot" is, and there is certainly no expert testimony in
the record equating any particular motorcycle engine temperature with any particular
distance driven.
34 Officers also found in Mr. Russo's residence a pair of boots which, at trial, it
attempted to link to a tread print left on J.W.'s balcony. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.371, L.20 p.372, L.12; Ex. 30.) However, despite what the officers may now claim, the possible
match of Mr. Russo's boots to the marks on the balcony would not have been
immediately apparent and, thus, Mr. Russo's boots would not have necessarily
implicated him. Indeed, even after thorough study, the State's expert was never able to
link Mr. Russo's specific boots to the marks on the balcony. (8/3/10 Tr., p.470, L.19 p.480, L.10.) In fact, she conceded that the boots found in Mr. Russo's residence are
common, as they are available at the Gowen Field Base Exchange, and a lot soldiers
deploying out of Gowen Field are wearing them. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.474, L.20 - p.475,
L.11.) In addition, the type of outsole in question, the "Sierra" produced by Vibram, is
not only available on boots like those possessed by Mr. Russo and common among
Idaho's soldiers, but is also used on numerous other brands of shoes or boots,
including: Wolverine, Belleville, Rocky Shoes, Weinbrenner, Danner, Bule, Brown,
McRae, Wellco, Altama, STC, Jengrate, Minor, and Son. (8/3/10 Tr., p.475, L.12 ~.476, L.14.)
5 The evidence discussed in this portion of Mr. Russo's Reply Brief was not before the
district court when the suppression motion was decided. However, because the State
never argued inevitable discovery based on an inevitable search incident to arrest
below and Mr. Russo, therefore, was deprived of an opportunity below to show why that
argument fails, fundamental fairness, i.e., due process, as guaranteed by the
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found latex gloves in the saddlebags on Mr. Russo's motorcycle (R., p.135)-latex
gloves which the State now claims were "similar to those used by the rapist" (Resp. Br.,
p.13)-the fact is that the State has offered no evidence to suggest that those latex
gloves fit any sort of specific description provided by J.W.

(See Ex. 1 (9-1-1 call

indicating that the rapist used "medical" gloves, but failing to otherwise describe them)).
Mr. Russo contends that clothing different from that which was described by the victim,
and latex gloves that were not shown to be similar to those used in the rape, were not
probative of his guilt and, therefore, even when coupled with the officers' hunch (arising
out of the fact that Mr. Russo was their usual suspect and had obviously driven his
motorcycle early that morning), did not give them probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo.
See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71.
Further, even if this Court could, in hindsight, say that probable cause existed,
that does not mean that Mr. Russo would have inevitably been arrested at that time?6
The fact is that the officers at the scene may not have subjectively believed probable
cause existed such that they could arrest Mr. Russo. Indeed, as noted above, the State
has voiced its belief that, without the video, it does not have a case against Mr. Russo.
(See R., p.121.) Thus, without that video, the officers might not have had sufficient
confidence in their case to arrest Mr. Russo. They may very well have wanted to await
forensic testing of the evidence accumulated to that point (e.g., DNA testing of the latex
gloves, expert analysis of the boot treads, or review of the cell phones and other

Fourteenth Amendment, demands that he be allowed to go outside the evidence that
was before the district court at the suppression hearing.
36 Because the State raised this argument for the first time on appeal, it missed its
opportunity to introduce evidence that the officers, in fact, would have arrested
Mr. Russo even without the cell phone video.
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electronic found within the residence), or they may have wanted to try to obtain an
identification of Mr. Russo by J.W., before arresting Mr. Russo. Indeed, it appears that
the authorities had been reasonably cautious with Mr. Russo before. Although he was a
suspect in certain other cases (and the evidence against Mr. Russo in those cases was
the same evidence that was used to obtain the search warrant in this case (see R.,
pp.123-32)), there is no evidence that he had ever actually been arrested in any of
those cases prior to the suppression proceedings in this case.
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Russo submits that the State has failed to prove that
an exception to the exclusionary rule applies and, therefore, the district court erred in
failing to suppress the evidence obtained in the illegal search of Mr. Russo's phone.

III.

The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly Prejudicial
Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual Interests
A.

Introduction
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404, evidence of a defendant's bad character or

bad acts may not admitted to show that the he is a person who acted in conformance
with his bad character. Evidence of the defendant's bad acts may be admitted for other
purposes though, such as to prove motive, intent, or plan.
In this case, the district court allowed the State to present evidence that
Mr. Russo has had sexual fantasies involving rape, and that he possessed pornography
depicting simulated rape, ostensibly to show that the Mr. Russo had the motive, intent,
and plan to rape J.W.

However, because the rape fantasy and rape pornography

evidence does not evidence any motive, intent, or plan on Mr. Russo's part to rape J.W.
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and because, even if it did, its probative value was so substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect, the district court erred in allowing the State to present this evidence to
the jury.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards
The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, generally speaking, evidence of "other

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that the person acted in conformity therewith."

I.R.E. 404(b).

However, such

evidence may be admitted "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... "
Id.

Under I.R.E. 404(b), there is a two-tiered analysis for determining the
admissibility of "prior bad act" evidence. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). The
court must first "determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other
crime or wrong as fact" and "whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if established,
would be relevant ... to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged,
other than propensity." Id. If the evidence is insufficient to establish the other crime or
wrong as fact, or if the other crime or wrong, even if proven, is not relevant to an issue
other than character or propensity, it is inadmissible and the inquiry ends.

See id.

However, if the evidence is sufficient to prove the other crime or wrong, and that crime
or wrong is relevant to some valid issue, the court must then "engage in a balancing
under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence." Id.
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Turning to the question of the applicable standard of review, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has held that the district court's determination that the evidence in question is
relevant to some issue besides the defendant's bad character is reviewed de novo, but
the district court's balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the unfair
prejudice to the defendant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 141
Idaho 148, 150 (Ct. App . 2004) .

C.

The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly
Prejudicial Evidence And Arg ument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual
Interests
As noted, prior to Mr. Russo's trial, the State sought leave to offer extensive

evidence of Mr. Russo's other crimes, wrongs, or acts, including evidence that he has
had sexual fantasies about rape and has possessed pornography depicting simulated
rape . The State argued that the fantasy and pornography evidence was relevant to a
non-character/non-propensity

issue-Mr.

Russo's

motive, intent, or

plan-and ,

therefore, was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (R. , pp.45 , 59-60, 88, 187-227, 228-35,
237; 3/18/10 Tr. , p.8, L.14 - p.19, L.11 ; 5/1 1/10 Tr., p.3, L.15 - p.4 , L.19, p.5, L.20p.6 , L.17, p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.3.) The district court agreed , and it ruled the rape fantasy
and rape pornography evidence admissible . (See R. , pp.175-76, 243 ; 3/18/10 Tr. , p.67 ,
L.14 - p.69 , L.9, p.77, L.25 - p.78, L.10 ; 4/22/10 Tr. , p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.13; 5/11/10
Tr., p.18, L.7 - p.25, L.22 , p.29, L.23 - p.31 , L.23.)
Mr. Russo contends that the district court's ruling was in error, as it was based on
a faulty application of the Grist standard. Specifically, Mr. Russo asserts that the rape
fantasy and rape pornography evidence is not relevant to any proper purpose and, even
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if it is marginally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice.

1.

The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case Was
Relevant Only To Mr. Russo's Character

Taken together, evidence of Mr. Russo's sexual fantasies involving rape and his
possession of pornography depicting simulated rape tend to show only that Mr. Russo is
sexually aroused by the thought and/or depiction of rape. It is not probative of whether
he was the one who actually raped J.W. on August 27, 2009; nor is it probative of any
actual plan or intent to rape J.W .

Indeed , the only way that this evidence can be

characterized as showing Mr. Russo's intent or plan to rape is to assume that because
Mr. Russo has a predilection for rape, he must have planned or intended to act in
conformity with that predilection; however, this is precisely the type of baseless
generalization that Rule 404 is intended to guard against. That Rule makes it clear that,
just because someone has done a certain act, shown a certain propensity, or exhibited
a certain character trait in the past, one cannot assume that he acted accordingly on the
date in question.

See I.R.E. 404.

Indeed, in this case, the prosecution never

attempted-either in arguing its motions in limine , or in arguing its case to the jury at
trial-to connect Mr. Russo's predilection for rape to any particular plan or scheme to
rape J.W .37
The only (proper) issue that Mr. Russo's predilection for rape could possibly be
relevant to would be motive. The theory, perhaps, would be that, given Mr. Russo's

Certainly, the State did raise the inference that J.W.'s rape was a carefully planned
crime. And the evidence supports this inference. But the State never attempted to
explain how Mr. Russo's rape fetish connected to any particular plan .

37
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predilections, he raped J.W. to satisfy his sexual desires; under this argument, sexual
gratification would be the motive. However, such an argument would make little sense
in a case such as this one. Quite obviously, anyone who breaks into a young woman's
apartment, clearly for the sole purpose of raping her, does so for the purpose of sating
his sexual urges. Thus, motive is simply not at issue in this case. Cf State v. Roach,
109 Idaho 973, 974-75 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that even in the case of a specific intent
crime, such as lewd conduct with a minor, because "the intent needed to convict can be
manifested by the circumstances attending the act," the defendant's intent may not be
sufficiently at issue in the case to warrant introduction of "other crimes" evidence aimed
at proving intent). Moreover, even if the motive of sexual gratification were somehow
relevant to this case, this motive has in no way been shown to be specific to J.W.
Accordingly, even if Mr. Russo had a motive to rape generally, this motive in no way
connects him particularly to the rape of J.W.

2.

Even If The Rape Fantasy And Rape Pornography Evidence In This Case
Was Relevant To Such Proper Topics As Motive, Intent, Or Plan, It Was
Nonetheless Inadmissible Because Its Probative Value Was Substantially
Outweighed By The Risk Of Unfair Prejudice To Mr. Russo

Assuming arguendo that there is some relevance to the evidence demonstrating
Mr. Russo's predilection for rape, the probative value of any such evidence is
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice attendant to that evidence.
Accordingly, he contends that the district court erred in finding it admissible under Rule
404(b).
Initially, as noted in Part III(C)(1), supra, it is Mr. Russo's contention that
evidence of his rape fantasies and his possession of pornography depicting simulated
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rape is wholly irrelevant to anything other than character or propensity; in particular, he
contends that it is not relevant to motive, intent, or plan. However, even if this Court
determines that such evidence is relevant to an issue such as motive, intent, or plan,
Mr. Russo contends that it is only marginally relevant (for same reasons, set forth
above, that he contends that it is not relevant at all).
More importantly, Mr. Russo contends that this evidence is extraordinarily
prejudicial.

As noted, it demonstrates a predilection for rape which, in the average

juror's mind, would likely be viewed as an extremely deviant and disturbing preference.
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that, traditionally, there has been
an "unstated belief that sexual deviancy is a character trait of especially powerful
probative value for predicting a defendant's behavior," State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
569-70 (2007) (quoting D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook § 13.9 (1995», so any
such evidence would tend to have a significant impact on the jury's verdict. Thus, in
recent years, the Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized that evidence of extreme
sexual deviancy is simply too prejudicial to the defendant to be put before the jury
where its probative value is marginal. See, e.g., State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459,466
(Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]here was a high risk that the jury would convict Pokorney based
upon propensity and sexual deviancy. We are constrained to conclude that the unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence."); State v.
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669-70 (2010) (finding that the error in admitting prior
instances of the defendant's sexual misconduct with children was not harmless because
"[e]vidence of prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is
a reasonable possibility this error contributed to Johnson's conviction"). As this is just
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such a case, it is apparent that the district court erred in concluding that the probative
value of the rape fantasy and rape pornography evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and, therefore, the district court erred in
admitting that evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court grant
review of all issues. Assuming it does so, Mr. Russo further requests that it reverse the
district court orders denying suppression of the cell phone video and admitting evidence
of his sexual fantasies and pornography; that it vacate his convictions and sentences;
and that it remand his case for a new trial.

DATED this 13th day of May, 2013.

Chief, Appellate Unit
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